Spinoza

Baruch Spinoza
Western philosopher
Modern times
Portrait of 1665 alleging the Herzog-August-Bibliothek
Birth	24 November 1632 United Provinces ( Amsterdam )
Deaths	21 February 1677 United Provinces ( The Hague )
School / tradition	Rationalism , eudemonism
Main interests	Ethics , biblical hermeneutics , ontology , politics , psychology
Notable ideas	Conatus , desire , Deus sive natura
Major works	Treaty reform of the understanding ; Ethics ; Theological-Political Treatise
Influenced by	Bruno , Descartes , Epicurus , Hobbes , Lucretius , Machiavelli , Maimonides
Influenced	Althusser , Bergson , Deleuze , Diderot , Einstein , Fichte , Freud , Hegel , Henry , Lessing , Macherey , Marx , Mendelssohn , Negri , Nietzsche , Schelling , Schopenhauer
change

Baruch Spinoza ( hey : ), also known as Bento de Espinosa or Benedictus de Spinoza (born 24 November 1632 , Amsterdam , Netherlands - died on 21 February 1677 , The Hague ) is a philosopher whose Dutch thought had a considerable influence on his contemporaries and many subsequent thinkers.

Born into a Jewish family Marrano , Spinoza was an heir critical Cartesianism. He distanced himself vis--vis all religious, but not thinking theologically through its many interfaith contacts. After his death, Spinoza, condemned as a doctrine atheist , had a lasting influence. Gilles Deleuze called him the "prince of philosophers" .

Origins

Baruch Spinoza was born in Amsterdam on 24 November 1632 in a family Jewish original Portuguese. His first name "Baruch (Benedictus by it Latinize - Benedict), means" blessed "in Hebrew. At that time the Portuguese Jewish community of Amsterdam is mainly composed of Marranos (Jews from the Iberian peninsula converted to Christianity , who for the most part secretly maintained a practice of Judaism ) who fled the Inquisition and the climate of intolerance towards converts. Far from the Spanish , most of them returning to Judaism. They are well tolerated and incorporated into Dutch society. If they speak Dutch with their non-Jews, they use the Portuguese as the vernacular and the Spanish culture as a vector. For Spinoza, the Latin language to be writing.

Spinoza attended the Talmud Torah (Jewish elementary school) of his community, gaining a good command of Hebrew culture and rabbinical. Led by Rabbi Mortera , he deepened his knowledge of the written law and access to the medieval commentaries of the Torah ( Rashi , Ibn Ezra ) as well as Jewish philosophy ( Maimonides ) . On the death of his father in 1654 , he resumed the family business with his brother Gabriel. After his excommunication from the Jewish community, he makes his living cutting of optical lenses for glasses and microscopes , an area where he acquired a certain fame.

Exclusion

The Portuguese Jews of Amsterdam - soaking in the atmosphere "tolerant" of the United Provinces - not a gated community. Yet the 27 July 1656 , the herem (decision of exclusion, excommunication ) that Spinoza cursed because of heresy is more severe and, unusually, final. Not long ago, a man would have even tried to stab Spinoza, who was wounded, would have retained the mantle torn by the blade to remember that religious passion leads to insanity. If the fact is not completely certain , it is part of the legend of the philosopher.

The exclusion of Spinoza is not the first crisis in the community. Some years earlier, Uriel da Costa had already defied his authority. Repentant, he should undergo humiliating punishment ( flogging public) to rejoin the community. However, he will reaffirm his ideas before committing suicide in 1640 , not 1647 as is often found. Juan de Prado , a friend of Spinoza, in turn, is excluded from the community in 1657.

It is difficult to know exactly what about the sanction herem , because no document mentions Spinoza's thought at this time. We know, however, that at that time he attended school libertine Franciscus van den Enden (perhaps when it opened in 1652 ), where he learned Latin, discovered the ancient (including Terence ) and the great thinkers ^sixteenth and ^seventeenth centuries, as Hobbes , Bacon , Grotius , Machiavelli. He rubs the heterodox of all faiths (including collegiality as Serrarius , scholars readers Descartes , whose philosophy has a profound influence on him). Probably at that time he professes that there is no God as "philosophically understood," that Jewish law is not of divine origin, and it is necessary to seek a better - reported about the Inquisition in 1659 by two Spaniards met with Spinoza and Juan de Prado during a stay in Amsterdam. Nevertheless, Spinoza seems to without displeasure welcome this opportunity to get rid of a community which no longer shared beliefs. There are no traces of any act of repentance for her to reconnect with .

The construction of the work

Around 1 660 - 1661 , Spinoza moved to Rijnsburg intellectual center of collegiality (heterodox Protestants ). There he receives a visit from Henry Oldenburg , secretary of the Royal Society , with whom he exchanged a long and rich correspondence. In 1663, he left for Rijnsburg Voorburg and begins to teach a student Casearius, the doctrine of Descartes. Of these courses, it takes the principles of the philosophy of Descartes, whose publication gave rise to a correspondence focuses on the problem of evil, with Willem van Blijenberg, a Calvinist merchant who will then produce refutations of the Ethical and Theological Treaty -political. It is likely that writing two books have preceded the publication of Principles: The Treaty Reform of the understanding (unfinished and published with the posthumous works) and the Short Treatise (published only in the nineteenth ^century).

In the 1660s, Spinoza is increasingly attacked as an atheist. If no trial is commenced it, unlike others of his contemporaries, probably because he writes in Latin and not in Dutch. In this tense context, he interrupts the writing of the Ethics in drafting the Theological-Political Treatise , in which he defends the freedom of philosophizing and denies the accusation of atheism. The book was published in 1670, on condition of anonymity, and with a false place of publication. It raises serious controversy, even among open minds as Leibniz , or Spinoza among men met occasionally in private, as the entourage Calvinist Louis II de Bourbon-Conde. For them, it is necessary to distinguish the new philosophy ( Descartes , Hobbes ) to more radical thinking of Spinoza. As for the religious authorities, they unanimously condemn the book. In April 1671, at the request of provincial synods, the Dutch court determines that an order must be taken to prohibit the dissemination of the Treaty and other works deemed blasphemous, as the Leviathan of Hobbes. She also asked that charges be brought against the perpetrators and others responsible for the publication of books. The States of Holland still reluctant to follow the court ruling and ban works written in Latin. It was only in 1674, after the fall of De Witt, the books listed will actually banned by the secular authorities.

The political context, with the French invasion, becomes even less favorable for Spinoza. The seizure of William of Orange over the United Provinces ends a period of quasi-republican liberalism. After the assassination of the brothers de Witt (1672), Spinoza's indignation was such that he wants to display a placard in the street against the assassins ("Ultima Barbarorum," the last of the barbarians), what would have deterred his landlord. However, the philosopher, who left for Voorburg The Hague in 1670, do not leave the country. So he refused in 1673, for the sake of independence, the invitation of the Elector Palatine, which proposed to host the University of Heidelberg.

In 1675, Spinoza attempts to publish the Ethics - recoiling from the risks - and begins to draft the Treaty policy. His audacious thought it worth a visit for fans or people like Leibniz. He died two years later, February 21, 1677. Despite its image as an isolated ascetic, he never ceased to be in a network of friends and correspondents, including Van Velthuysen Lambert , who at least partially contradicts his reputation as a loner. They, especially the physician Ludovic Meyer, who publish his posthumous works: the ethics , the most important and unfinished three treaties ( Treaty reform of the understanding , the Political Treatise and the Abstract of Hebrew grammar).

Philosophy

The Ethics

The ultimate end of philosophy, according to Spinoza, is the creation of a genuine ethics of happiness and freedom. Particularly described in the Ethics , but also in other works, Spinoza's Ethics is first to reconcile determinism and freedom. Such a proposal goes against the belief in free will , which is only ignorance of causes that determine us. It is demonstrated by a long train of thought.

First, to Spinoza, the natural right of every individual is strictly correlative to the power of nature . The " natural laws "that prevent so what is" non-executable "or" not desirable "( Theological-Political Treatise , hereafter TTP, IV).

Since everything trying to "persevere in its being" ( conatus ), it is about awareness to better use them. The way to achieve this lies in the reason and love of God, that is to say, Nature (Deus sive Natura). Freedom thus consists in the knowledge of causes of action. The more one knows the world, the more we know God, therefore it is more joyful. Knowledge is thus not just an introductory ethics: it is fully part.

By definition, any action is appropriate and complete an idea which comes from the mind , while all love is incomplete because an inadequate idea that proceeds from the imagination. Therefore it suffices to take a reflective knowledge of a passion for it to become an action. There are passions which increase our power to act (for example, if I heal), but, instead, all actions increase our power to act. The purpose of ethics is to become active, ie to express the power of our understanding rather than imagination. Moreover, our understanding is eternal, while the part of our mind is the imagination and memory (incomplete ideas, related to the empirical existence of things) perishes with the body.

In the famous letter to Schuller about freedom and determinism, which he takes the example of the movement of the stone, Spinoza writes: "I is not freedom in free decision, but in free necessity" . Freedom does not preclude and the need nor the natural determinism, for example, in the case of Kant , who in the Critique of Practical Reason opposes freedom practical supersensible or transcendental to Pattern empirical causes and effects.

Spinoza's ethical theory is directly contrary to the idea that evil is the result of a weak man or a "defect of human nature" , weakness, which itself was due to sin the original Adam and the Fall. Unlike St. Augustine ( City of God , Book XXII), it does not consider that there are two states of human nature, one which preceded the fall and one that would post lapsaire.

According to Spinoza, "it depends on not more of us to be of sound mind and body, since freedom is not opposed to determinism , and Adam had no more power than we think correctly . The idea of "fall" is foreign to Spinoza's Ethics.

His conception of evil is developed especially in letters to Blyenbergh , or "letters of evil", which were commented on by Deleuze . Evil has no real ontological existence: just as the error , which it proceeds, there is nothing "positive". It is therefore denied the sight of God, and becomes deprivation in relation to us. There is no error per se, there are ideas that are incomplete or inadequate. Pure negativity, evil is lack of power and a hierarchy it follows that we ask the imagination between being an abstract ideal and we plaquons him. So, I say that the blind are deprived of sight, because I imagine it as being light ( Letter to Blyenbergh XXI ). In the letter to Blyenbergh XIX , Spinoza and frontally opposed to what some contemporary philosophers have called the divine command theory :

"But me, I do not place the blame and evil are anything positive, much less that anything can happen or be against the will of God. Not content to assert that the fault is nothing positive, I say also that we are talking inappropriately and so anthropomorphic , when we say that a man commits a sin against God or offend God. "

According to him, "everything in nature, considered in its essence and in its perfection, envelope and expresses the concept of God" ( TTP , IV): in this sense, the fool who acts according to the passions is as perfect as the wise, acting in accordance with reason. One can not speak of imperfection of a fool than by comparing with other realities, superior (eg Sage). The evil is deprivation in terms of our understanding, but nothing from the standpoint of the Divine . For example, we consider it a bad man, or say he is deprived of something (of goodness, wisdom ...) because we are comparing this man to a general concept of man, with whom he seems default:

"Humans, in fact, are used to gather all the individuals of the same genus, for example those who have the outward appearance of man, they give an identical definition for all these individuals and believe that all are able to achieve the highest perfection, which can be deduced from this definition (...) But God knows nothing abstract nor a general definition "

This conception of freedom and evil has been misunderstood by his contemporaries, who could not conceive that we can maintain the responsibility of man if one takes away the free will: thus Blyenbergh he wrote: "if man is as you say, this is equivalent to declaring that the wicked honor God by their works as much as the pious (...) If God indeed has no knowledge of evil, it is much less credible he must punish the evil. So why persist that keep me eagerly committing crimes of any kind, provided that I escape to the judge? (...) The virtue, you say, must be loved for herself. But how do I love virtue? I have not received shares a large quantity of gasoline and perfection "( Letter XX ). Spinoza has often defended against this objection: it responds to Schuller , who insinuates that such a theory would excuse "any felony" in referring to the Appendices containing the metaphysical thoughts:

"We ask again: Why are they the wicked punished, since they act by their nature and the divine decree? I reply that it is also by divine decree and if they are punished only those we imagine sin under their own freedom shall be punished, why men want to exterminate poisonous snakes? because they sin because of their nature and can not do otherwise. "

Similarly, in letter 78 to Oldenburg , he writes:

"What I said in my previous letter, we are without excuse before God because we are in the power of God like clay in the potter's hand, must be understood in the sense that nobody can send to reproach God because God gave him a weak nature without force or soul. Since it would be absurd in fact that the circle is pitied because God has not given the properties of the sphere (...) But, you insist, if men sin by a natural necessity, they are excusable. (...) Do you mean that God can become irritated against them or that they are worthy of happiness, that is to say, worthy to have the knowledge and love of God? If it's in the first sense I admit fully: God is not irritable, everything happens according to his decree. But I do not see that this is a reason for all to attain to bliss: men, in fact, may be excusable, and yet deprived of the happiness and suffer torments of many kinds. A horse is excusable to be horse and not man. Who becomes enraged by the bite of a dog must be excused to the truth and yet we have the right to strangle him. And, finally, can not govern his desires, or hold them by the fear of the law, although it should be excused because of its weakness, can not enjoy peace of mind, knowledge and the love of God, but necessarily perished. "

It is not necessary to presuppose free will, responsibility, and consequently the guilt , to apply a punishment. But, and this Spinoza agrees with Kant, who refrains from crime by fear of punishment can not be said to act morally ( Letter XXI ). Second, the Ethics is a path to wisdom, which is aimed in principle at all: no one is in principle excluded from the possibility of redemption. All these prejudices, according to Spinoza, from a design anthropomorphic God, who takes it as a "person" who would or would hate this or that, or would be there to judge us ( Letter to Blyenbergh XXI ) or like Moses , who represented him "like a chief, a legislator, a king, although all these attributes belong solely to the human nature and are well distant from God" ( TTP , IV). This is why Deleuze said that the existence, for Spinoza, is not a trial but a trial, an experiment .

Furthermore it should be noted that, if Nature is determined so necessary, Spinoza distinguishes between two meanings of other "laws" on the one hand there are natural laws, on the other hand, the positive law or civil law, that men voluntarily give themselves ( TTP , IV). However, insofar as natural law expresses the nature of every being, it does not vanish in the civil society (see below for political theory).

Theory of Knowledge

The philosophy of Spinoza's speculative attempts to be deductive , necessary. It is written more geometrico is to say by following the "geometric" axioms and postulates, and definitions, and then demonstrations. It is developed along strictly logical sequences derived from definitions , the model of mathematics. However, this choice is not arbitrary: it is the result of a true reflection on the essence of knowledge, linked with the need. We must therefore begin by discussing the idea of knowledge in general in his philosophy , an idea which we find elements primarily in the Tractatus de intellectus amendatione (often translated as Treatise on reform of the understanding, retranslated by Bernard Pautrat under As the most literal of Treaty amendment of the intellect).

The degrees of knowledge

On three occasions in his work, Spinoza develops a typology of modes of knowledge:

• in the Treaty reform of the understanding , 10-16;
• in the Short Treatise , Book II, Chapter 1;
• in the Ethics , Part II, proposition 40, Scholium 2.

The three presentations are different: they do not always contain the same types of knowledge, and not always in the same order. But behind these differences, it appears certain constants.

The Treaty Reform of the understanding

In the Treaty of the reform of the understanding , Spinoza distinguishes several kinds of perception :

"On closer inspection, all our modes of perception can be reduced to four complementary approaches:

I. There is a knowledge by hearsay, that is to say freely identified and described by everyone.

II. There is a perception called "empirical," by which, experiencing a sensation or a feeling widely shared by other individuals, we set ourselves the "acquis". This perception is not developed by our understanding, but it is validated to the extent that any fact not contradictory seemed perfected.

III. There is a perception called "deductive," which involves entering into a coherent and rational than the observed fact occurred. The reasoning leads us to clarify a principle, but not the origin of the latter.

IV. Finally there is a perception called "essential" or "basic", whereby we grasp the essence of the thing perceived. Collect this thing back then, here, to perceive the essence or principle first. "

By comparing certain types of perceptions, one can get a better idea of what the fourth mode of perception.

The perception by hearsay (I) is the most uncertain of perception: for example, we consider that every day we know our date of birth, even if we were not there to check.

The simple experiment (II), as it presents itself to us, this is a haphazard and unintentional. This experiment does not give us true knowledge: it gives us specific elements in time and space , elements that are printed in the consciousness and remain there only if they have not been contradicted by any other experiments. Otherwise, we are in doubt. These experiences can not offer us any certainty. She was appointed by Spinoza experientia vaga. It is a simple enumeration of cases, enumeration is not rational because it is not a principle (IV) or deductible of a principle (III), and can not therefore be held seriously for real.

These first two modes of perception have in common is being irrational, while useful for the conduct of daily business life. The mark of their irrationality is uncertain where they put us, if we follow them. Therefore, whenever possible, they do not play a role in the construction of knowledge. This is also why the Ethics group these first two modes of perception in one "kind of knowledge" which he called "opinion" or "imagination."

Rational knowledge (III) any other procedures: further isolate the phenomena , it links them in a coherent sequence in the order deductive. That is what Descartes called "chains of reason" (see Discourse on Method , II) or less. But as it were, why hang the first link in the chain of reasons? If it is left floating, the door open to infinite regress, that Spinoza denies, as Aristotle in Metaphysics ("You have to stop somewhere!"). If it attaches to another link in the chain already constructed, we form a logical loop ( petitio principii ), ie, a contradiction. Therefore, for the knowledge formed by the chain of reasons to be true (and only coherent), it must be dependent on a given true idea, which forms the principle / I>.

The third mode of perception is a way to store and transmit the truth of the starting point ( principle ), but not to produce it. That brings us to the necessity of the fourth mode.

This is an intuitive knowledge (IV). As Spinoza says himself: "Habemus IDEAM Verame (" we have a true idea, "Treatise on reform of the understanding, 33). This is the true idea of God , which is in itself and can be designed by itself (definition of substance in Ethics I, 3). This is the starting point absolute necessary for any adequate knowledge, the original truth, which is "standard itself and the false" ( Ethics , II, 43).

After the Treaty reform of the understanding, levels of knowledge, became the "kinds of knowledge" will move from number 4 to the 3.

Gilles Deleuze , in his lectures on Spinoza uses three examples to illustrate the three kinds of knowledge present in the Ethics , each corresponding to a kind of life of its own:

• The first kind of knowledge is empirical, "I bubbled in the water, my body suffers the waves and water."
• The second kind of knowledge is empirical and rational: "I can swim, in the sense that I know my call reports with the reports of the wave, with the water element.
• The third kind is purely rational: "I know the species that depend on the reports, I know what are the water, wave, wave, Archimedes' principle, causes, etc..

Deleuze also states that mathematics is the formalization of the second kind.

In the Short Treatise

Short Treatise, Book II, Chapter 1.

In Ethics

Ethics, Part II, proposition 40, Scholium 2.

Truth

Spinoza rejects the classical theory of truth that the truth of an idea is subject to reality. In this classical conception , truth is an extrinsic quality and is defined by the adequacy of the idea with his Idat (object): truth is then adaequatio rei et intellectus. Spinoza will support its own conception of truth by resorting to mathematical science in which truth is not dependent on the existence of the object. Indeed, when a mathematician studying a subject (eg a triangle) and properties (the sum of the angles of a triangle equal two right), it does not ask whether that object actually exists outside the mind that conceives it. The truth is no longer defined in relation to the object, but relative to the subject of knowledge

For Spinoza, the truth is an intrinsic quality of the idea and is proving itself without any reference to his being adamant: "Of course, as light is to know itself and promotes the darkness, the truth is standard itself and the false "(Ethics II, Prop.. 43, note).

Spinoza is thus inspired by some of the Cartesian theory of knowledge, that the idea has a real intrinsic sign (the "clear and distinct" unveiled by the natural light from Descartes), while breaking with the conventional design subordination from idea to reality.

One can, for simplicity, identify three characteristics of the true idea in Spinoza:

1. The truth is internal to the idea: the mathematics allows Spinoza to reject the notion of extrinsic convenience of the idea to his Idat (thus passing the science of nature to mathematical science).
2. The truth is his own sign: stumble upon the truth, it still be in the wrong (see the Reform Treaty of Mind)
3. The truth is consistent with its purpose: matching the object is no longer a condition for the truth of the idea, but only a characteristic of true.

Metaphysics

God is Nature, the unique and infinite substance. Only the substance has the power to exist and act by itself. Everything that is done, however, exists in and of something else, whereby it is also designed (method definition). The substance has infinite attributes (as a first approximation, an attribute is a mode of expression, a way to be perceived), of which only two are accessible to us: thought and extension. Anything singular, finite, is a way, that is to say something that is simultaneously part of and effect of any substance. Every mode has two aspects. On one side the user is only partly determined, engaged in external relations with all other modes. But on the other hand, any method of accurately expresses the essence and absolute existence of God in this sense that the user is a condition of the substance. The challenge is to understand that everything belongs to all attributes simultaneously (infinite) of God.

For example, a stone is a physical body in space, but an idea, the idea of stone (and something else that we do not know). An individual is a relation of movement and rest. For example, a cell, an organ, a living organism, a corporation, a solar system, etc.. So there are individuals nested. The individual is supreme universal nature, which does not change (the ratio of motion and rest is given by the laws of physics, these laws never change). To each individual, that is to say to each thing is an idea. But the spirit is something other than the idea of this thing. The spirit of Socrates, is the idea of the body of Socrates. So everything has a spirit: it is the animism of Spinoza. But there is a hierarchy between the spirits: a spirit is even richer than it is the idea of a body with many skills and be assigned to act. That is why the spirit of man is richer than the spirit of the frog or stone. Another consequence is that the idea of my body (because the idea of my body), I thought of all the conditions (changes) of the body, so things that affect the body (such as the Sun I see), or more precisely the change that causes the sun to me. That is why we feel something more reveals the nature of our body than the thing 'in itself.

The essence of everything is an effort ( conatus , desire) to persevere in its being, in the same manner as stone perseveres in its movement or human life. This can be understood in a static sense (persevere in its state) or a dynamic sense (increasing power), which is probably more relevant. Each thing (fashion party) can be affected by others. Among these conditions, some are changing our power to act: when Spinoza speaks of affect. If this affect our power increases, it manifests as joy, pleasure, love, joy, etc.. If he declines, it is felt as sadness, pain, hatred, pity, etc.. In other words, all joy is the feeling that accompanies the increase of our power, while all suffering is the feeling that accompanies the decline. Since everything strives to persevere in its being, there is no death wish: death comes from outside, by definition.

The substance, attributes and methods

The first book of Ethics, entitled "God" actually opens on the definition of the substance ( definitions 1 and 3 ) and the attributes and methods ( definitions 4 and 5 ), God being achieved only 'to the sixth definition. The substance is defined before God.

The substance is "that which is in itself and is conceived through itself, that is to say what the concept does not need the concept of another thing to be trained" (Ethics I, Def 3 ). While Descartes conceived a variety of substances, Spinoza develops a unique substance is absolutely infinite and consists of an infinite number of attributes: God or Nature (Deus sive natura). But do not think that the attributes are effects of the substance and that it expresses a certain transcendence vis--vis them (The Spinoza is a immanentism): the substance and attributes are "the same thing "(Ethics I, corollary 2, prop. 20 ), the attribute is the perception of the substance by the understanding. We know only two attributes of substance: the extension and thought, but there are an infinity.

The substance and attributes are what Spinoza calls the constituent nature , as opposed to Nature natured , consisting of the infinity of modes (modifications of the substance) produced necessarily by God himself (Ethics I, Prop. Scholium. 29 ).

Modes are modes of being of the substance collected in each of its attributes. A human being is such a body, that is to say, a mode of extension, and a spirit, that is to say, a mode of thought. We must however distinguish between infinite modes (immediate and mediate) and finite modes: immediate infinite modes are those that follow from the absolute nature of some attribute of God; mediate infinite modes are those resulting mediately nature of an attribute God, therefore as an attribute that is assigned an infinite change. The movement is such an immediate infinite mode of the extent ( Letter 64 to Schuller ).

The parallelism

The term parallelism is not even in the texts of Spinoza, but was imported in retrospect by his commentators (this term was used by Leibniz in his "Considerations on the doctrine of a universal spirit").

We know that, for Spinoza, each individual has a body, how the scope, and spirit, way of thinking, and this spirit is the idea of the body. Under the unity of substance, there must be identity between each attribute order modes (isomorphism) and identity of connections (isonomy). So there is correspondence between the affections of the body and ideas in the mind. It therefore follows that any body can be designed in the mode of the extent and in the mode of the mind. For example, there must be correspondence between the mode of being extended to the stone and its mode of being in his mind. But Spinoza rejects any causal link between these modes, since body and mind are one and the same thing seen from two different attributes.

The term parallelism reflects this idea of correspondence without causal reciprocity, which allows Spinoza to give equal dignity to the body and spirit: there is no devaluation of the body in favor of the spirit.

The term of parallelism is criticized today because of the dualism that induces The conatus

The conatus is the effort by which "every thing, as it is in itself, strives to persevere in its being" (Ethics III, Prop. 6). This effort is "nothing outside the actual essence of the thing" (Ethics III, Prop.. 7).

The conatus is an expression of the power of a thing, or an individual, as it is designed as a finite mode, that is to say a part of nature natured. It is, thus, faced with a multitude of external causes that will sometimes stop his efforts, sometimes afford (Ethics IV, Prop.. 4). In humans, the conatus is nothing but the desire that is naturally tend towards what is good for him. Spinoza reverses a common desire that man should desire a thing because he deems proper, "which founded the effort, will, appetite, desire, it's not that we have considered a good thing, but on the contrary, we judge that something is good for that very reason that it tends effort, desire, appetite, desire. "(Ethics III, Prop. 9, Scholium). What is first in Spinoza is the idea and desire, consciousness bringing nothing to the appetite. Consciousness is not, as in Descartes, the expression of the infinite will of man, but a simple reflection of the idea itself. The body and mind are one and the same, sometimes seen in the extended attribute, now under the attribute thought. Each attribute is independent and designed by itself, nor the body can not determine mind to think, nor the mind can not determine the body in motion or at rest (a consequence of parallelism, or the unity of substance). The awareness effort is not a reflection of the mind on the idea of the effort, but a reflection of the idea of effort in mind. Consciousness is an illusion, a dream with open eyes, the essence of man is his power (of the body and mind, mind is merely the idea of the body).

The conatus results in the preservation and affirmation of being: maintaining the characteristic relation of movement and rest between body parts (shape retention) on the one hand, and increasing the number of ways in which the body may be affected by other bodies, and in turn affect the other (Ethics IV, Prop.. 48 and 49).

The conatus plays a fundamental role in the theory of affect in Spinoza. Desire is one of three primary emotions with joy and sadness. When the effort, or desire, will be a success, the individual will move to a higher power or perfection, and is said to be affected by a feeling of joy on the contrary, if his effort is prevented, he spent a greater to a lesser perfection and will be said to affect a sense of sadness. Spinoza's entire theory of affects and is built on the principle of a continuous passage of a lesser to greater perfection, and vice versa, depending on the success or failure of conatus, itself determined by the encounter with finite modes and external diseases of the body as a result.

Philosophy of Religion: Is Spinoza an atheist?

It is among the first to tackle an exegesis rationalist of the Bible which led him to make the distinction between belief and knowledge. Identifying God with Nature, Spinoza was a pantheist , according to the readings using the formula Deus sive Natura to justify this reading.

Spinoza was also renowned atheist (see eg. the record of Pierre Bayle in his Dictionary .

However, there is a tendency to consider this connection between the thought of Spinoza and libertinism as a cons-sense .

If this assertion of the supposed atheism of Spinoza was originally critical and pejorative, it was claimed, in the twentieth century by other commentators, like Althusser , Negri and Deleuze. These three authors insist effect on the opposition between a design transcendental philosophy of the divine and materialistic of immanence : God is not outside the world but immanent in nature, it is Nature. Similarly, man and society are not external to nature: we must not conceive of man as an "empire within an empire." Also, if sometimes Deleuze speaks of atheism of Spinoza, it is by no means an atheist in the usual sense: the divine is preserved, but in a form immanent.

Spinoza explicitly rejects any conception anthropomorphic God, that is to say who would design the image of a " person "human. This rejection of anthropomorphism occurs very early in his thought: it is explicit when writing the Appendix containing the metaphysical thoughts, following the exposure of the Philosophy of Descartes : "God is improperly is said to hate or love something. "

He denies that man has become defective after the Fall : for him, Adam is no less faulty, or more perfect than we are today (see above).

The theology and politics: religion and politics

In the Theological-Political Treatise , a major work published during his lifetime, he shows how many theological assertions of churches and religions are, in fact, pronouncements policies that have nothing to do with the biblical text. It draws on the writings of Abraham ibn Ezra and fully incorporates the reading of the Bible, for which he proposes a new reading method, which applies to follow this principle that the text is explained by the text itself own, without replacing it with interpretations more or less "free." That is to say that in case of misunderstanding of the reader, or dark text, or contradiction of it, he must look elsewhere in the text, some passages may shed light that we seek to understand. In other words, the answer is in the text, and should not be sought in the reader's imagination. Any interpretation is prohibited. It is about learning to read the text, respecting it, or the entire text, which necessarily contains the answer sought.

Indeed, this is based on the principle of the prevalence of the text on the imagination, but also on the explicit affirmation that God and God's word can not be contrary to reason. This would be an insult to God than to assume otherwise. As for Maimonides , before him, and Averroes ( Ibn Rushd ), the agreement of reason and the divine message can not not be: it is by nature, according to the perfection of God, they can only necessarily agree.

If the text of the Bible can not but agree with the reason, its obscurities and contradictions must be resolved by a careful study and a careful reading of the text that she should not turn into the interpreter, who then shall refrain to reinvent it as needs arise.

Spinoza, like Hobbes before him, engages in a critical demonstration of harm from the use of religion, that is to say, the belief of men by the political powers, and who lead their subjects to follow their docile decisions and carry out their projects, even worse. Religion - religious belief - and is the safest and easiest to do the right thing to men in power, even though it would be to do what is most harmful to themselves and most shameful. But they do not notice it, and thinking to do good and contribute to the salvation of their souls, they do exactly the opposite, they are deceived by political speeches in the form of religious injunctions and promises.

According to this theory of religious illusion and any interest of any power to maintain it, Spinoza complete analysis of theological analysis of politics, explaining the principles of political organization and good returns to be maintained religion and politics in order to allow peace. As previously theorized before him Hobbes in Leviathan, religion should be subject to common laws, which apply to her as to all, subject to state and political power, and should take care that government of souls and teach the good and moral.

So, it can develop what is the purpose of the book, a political theory of freedom, showing how it is bracketed by the laws, then what freedom of thought and opinion is entirely good and must be fully recognized by the state. First, the recognition of freedom to believe and think freely given to each is the condition of the late religious conflicts. Secondly, this freedom is entirely good and not likely to harm the state - if the appropriate work-sharing is achieved between the religious and political authorities - that freedom can be granted without any restriction, except as falls under incitement to hatred and would be likely to harm the state. Freedom of thought must be protected by the State as a condition of civil peace. The freedom of not harming the State these conditions.

This is a theory of democracy and a defeat of the dictatorship, the power that claims to go beyond its power. In fact "no one has the power to command languages" since men themselves can not control what they say, so it is the same for power. If the power can not control the language (speaking outside the control of the speaker), a fortiori he can not control the thoughts. The state, in fact, does not govern all aspects of human life, the laws can not be extended to all activities, "human nature can not bear to be absolutely stress" (Chapter V), and " wanting to run everything by laws that make men bad "(Chapter XX).

This is why "no one can give freedom to judge and think; everyone is master of his thoughts." It is a right that everyone is of its nature.

The legacy of Spinoza and the current debates

Spinoza was both a "thinker cursed," described as "dead dog" by Moses Mendelssohn in a letter to Lessing , and an acclaimed thinker, and first by Hegel. In the second half of the ^twentieth century , the revival of Spinoza studies has been particularly marked by its cross-reading Karl Marx and his insistence on materialism, the immanent nature of his philosophy and social thought of as transindividual, to possibly challenge the assumptions of methodological individualism , with works such as that of Alexandre Matheron (pt) (Individual and Community in Spinoza, ed. de Minuit, 1969), Gilles Deleuze (Spinoza and the Problem expression in 1968 and most accessible Spinoza - Practical Philosophy, 1981), Pierre Macherey (Hegel or Spinoza, Maspero, 1977) or of Toni Negri (The Savage Anomaly: power and power in Spinoza, 1982) or more recently, Frank Fischbach (The production of men with Spinoza, Marx, 2005) or Andre Toselli (Spinoza or the other (in) finitude, 2008). Cons contract theory, the reference in the Treaty to the political organization of the multitude of affects free united by common offers a new basis for thinking about the constitution of the state .

Finally, most recently, Maxime Rovere and David Rabouin have renewed approach to the system of Spinoza, one through a new translation of correspondence and a monograph (Maxime Rovere, Exist. Methods of Spinoza, Paris, CNRS Editions , 2010) where the notion of system is replaced by methods plural, heterogeneous and local, the other by adapting the system to a formalism no longer borrows to Euclid, but Riemann (David Rabouin, live here. Spinoza, Ethics local, Paris, PUF, 2010).

Sources

Structures used in the drafting of the article (part biography):

• Roger-Pol Droit , "Spinoza cursed" , article published in Le Monde of 24 July 2003.
• Robert Misrahi , Spinoza, Medicis-interlacing Publishing, 2005.
• Pierre-Franois Moreau , Spinoza and Spinoza, Paris, PUF , " Que sais-je? ", 2003.
• Steven Nadler , Spinoza, Biography, Bayard Editions, 2003.
• Maxime Rovere , Exist. Methods of Spinoza, Paris, CNRS Editions , 2010.

Works

• Short treatise of God, man and bliss (circa 1660, discovered in 1852)
• Treaty reform of the understanding (1661 published in 1677)
• Theological-Political Treatise (1670)
• Principles of the philosophy of Descartes (1663)
• Metaphysical Thoughts (1663)
• Ethics (published 1677)
• Political treatise (published 1677)
• Short of Hebrew grammar (published 1677)
• Letters (75 published in 1677, 88 discoveries to date)

Bibliography

Bibliography on Spinoza

• Alain (Emile Chartier) , Spinoza, Gallimard , 1901 editions Delaplane, Reed. 1972
• Ferdinand Alqui , Lessons on Spinoza, Editions de la Table Ronde , 2003
• Alqui Ferdinand , The rationalism of Spinoza, Presses Universitaires de France , Paris, 1981
• Etienne Balibar , Spinoza and Politics, Presses Universitaires de France , Parisjour =, 1985
• Franoise Barbaras , Spinoza, mathematical science of liberty, Philosophy CNRS , Paris, 2007 ( ISBN 2271064961 )
• Gilbert Boss , The Teaching of Spinoza's Short Treatise Comment, Editions du Grand Midi , Zrich, 1982 (ISBN 2-88093-102-9)
• Gilbert Boss , The difference in philosophy: Spinoza and Hume, Editions du Grand Midi , Zrich, 1982, 1114 p. (ISBN 2-88093-103-7)
• Rene Bouveresse, , Paris, Vrin, 1992.
• Laurent Bove , , Paris, Vrin , 1996.
• Lon Brunschvicg , , Paris, Flix Alcan , 1894.
• Julien Busse, , Publications de la Sorbonne, 2009
• Lon Chestov , , Paris, Flammarion, 1971.
• Yves Citton , , Paris, ditions Amsterdam , Caute! , 2006.
• Antonio Damasio , , 2003
• Victor Delbos , , Vrin, 1950.
• Gilles Deleuze , , Paris, ditions de Minuit, 1978.
• Gilles Deleuze , , Paris, ditions de Minuit, 1981.
• Jean-Claude Fraisse , , Paris, Vrin, 1978.
• Georges Friedmann , , Paris, Gallimard, 1962.
• Martial Guroult , , Aubier, Paris, 1961-1974.
• Jonathan Israel, , Paris, ditions Amsterdam, 2005.
• Chantal Jaquet , , Kim, 1997.
• Chantal Jaquet , , PUF, 2004.
• Chantal Jaquet , , Publications de la Sorbonne 2005.
• Pierre Macherey , , Paris, PUF, 1994-1998.
• Frdric Manzini, , Paris, PUF, coll. "Epimthe", 2009.
• Alexandre Matheron, , Paris, ditions de Minuit, 1969.
• Alexandre Matheron, Le christ et le salut des ignorants, Paris, Editions Aubier, 1971.
• Jean-Clet Martin, Brviaire de l'ternit -entre Vermeer et Spinoza , Lo Scheer, version numrique, 2009.
• Robert Misrahi , , 1997.
• Robert Misrahi , , Paris, Les Empcheurs de penser en rond , 2005.
• Robert Misrahi , , Paris, Mdicis-Entrelacs, 2005.
• Pierre-Franois Moreau , , Paris, PUF, 1993, rd. 2009.
• Steven Nadler, , Biographie, ditions Bayard, 2003.
• Toni Negri , , trad. Franois Matheron, Paris, PUF, 1982 ; rdition, Paris, ditions Amsterdam, 2007. ( Avec les prfaces de Gilles Deleuze, Pierre Macherey, d'Alexandre Matheron et l' avertissement du traducteur ).
• Jean-Claude Piguet, , Labor et fides, Genve, 1987.
• Charles Ramond, , Ellipses, 2007.
• Bernard Rousset, , Paris, Vrin, 1968.
• Maxime Rovere , , Paris, CNRS Editions, 2010.
• Andr Scala , , Paris, Les Belles Lettres, 1998.
• Goce Smilevski, , Chicago, Northwestern University Press, 2006.
• , Zur Erinnerung an Hans-Christian Lucas d. par Eva Schrmann, Norbert Waszek et Frank Weinreich, Stuttgart-Bad Cannstatt, Frommann-Holzboog, 2002 ( ISBN 3772820271 ).
• Bruno Streiff, , Paris, ditions Complicits, 2004.
• Ariel Suhamy et Alia Daval, , Ollendorff et Desseins, 2008.
• Andr Tosel , , Aubier, 1984.
• Paul Vernire, , Paris, PUF, 1954.
• Harry Austryn Wolfson (en) , (1934), traduit de l'anglais par Anne-Dominique Balms, coll. Bibliothque de philosophe, Gallimard, Paris, 1999.
• Yovel Yirmiyahu, , Paris, ditions du Seuil , 1991.
• Sylvain Zac, , Paris, PUF, 1963.
• Franois Zourabichvili , , Paris, PUF, 2002.
• Franois Zourabichvili , , Paris, PUF, 2002.
• Elhanan Yakira, , Editions du Grand Midi, Zurich, 1989.

Bibliographie des uvres de Spinoza

ditions intgrales

• (uvres connues de Spinoza) Van Vloten et Land. La Haye, d. M. Nijhoff, 1882-1883.
• (4 volumes), Gebhardt. Heidelberg, d. C. Winter, Auftrag des Heidelberger Akademie des Wissenschaften, 1924.
• , Traduction Charles Appuhn, Flammarion ; coll. GF , 4 volumes.
• de Spinoza. Traduction de Roland Caillois, M. Francs et Robert Misrahi , Paris, Gallimard, coll. La Pliade , 1954.
• , sous la direction de Pierre-Franois Moreau , Paris, PUF, coll. pimthe , en cours de parution : dj deux volumes parus : , trad. Pierre-Franois Moreau et Jacqueline Lagre ; , trad. Charles Ramond.

See also

Related articles

• Ethics
• Johannes Bredenburg
• Pantheism
• Perception
• Theory of Knowledge
• Netherlands
• Yves Citton
• Leon Shestov

External Links

• Category Baruch Spinoza directory dmoz

Works online

• Spinoza and Us : collaborative work of digitization of texts, as well as studies, reviews and online discussions.
• Hyperspinoza : Spinoza's complete works translated by Charles Appuhn a Hyper-Ethics', articles, and supplements.
• Spinoza.fr : a continuous reading of the Ethics, and articles.
• EthicaDB : publication hypertextual and multilingual (Latin, English, French, Italian, German, Dutch, etc.).'s Ethics

Articles, courses, online study

• Friends of Spinoza
• Bulletin of bibliography Spinoza
• Deleuze Courses
• Spinoza , by Alain
• Moral worth of joy from Spinoza , Alain rerpris on the site of the Classics of Social Sciences (UQAC)
• "Reading the Ethics of Spinoza" by Pierre Macherey , Public Access
• "Is Spinoza monistic? " by Pierre Macherey, site of Lille 3
• "Have trade: Spinoza and modes of exchange" http://asterion.revues.org/document908.html , in Asterion n. 5, Maxime Rovere
• "The scope of the social contract in Hume and Spinoza" , Gilbert Boss
• Directories

• Academy of Toulouse
• Paris Academy

References

• Philosophy portal
• Portal of the ^seventeenth century
• Portal Netherlands

Leave a Reply